MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

25X1 FROM: [redacted]
Chief, Policy Branch/PPS/OS

SUBJECT: Implementation at CIA of NTISSP #2: National Policy on Protection of Sensitive, but Unclassified Information in Federal Government Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems

1. On 8 December 1986, subject national policy was
25X1 discussed at a meeting attended by [redacted] OIS,
25X1 [redacted] OIT, [redacted] OC, [redacted] OS/ISSD, and the undersigned. The purpose of the meeting was to develop initial approaches as to how the policy is applicable at CIA and what, if any, might be the resource implications. The following pertinent points were raised:

° a. There is much less of a problem at CIA than at DoD and elsewhere because CIA contributes much less to technical data bases. Nonetheless, CIA does contribute to NTIS and probably economic and other data bases. OIT and OS have collected a listing of unclassified data bases which would provide a starting place for identifying those which contain sensitive but unclassified information. Once such a determination is made, the sensitive information should be removed or the system. If removal is not possible or practical, the system should be flagged in some way so that controls can be applied when and if the information is moved to an uncontrolled environment. A Headquarters Notice could serve to notify managers of the procedures, some of which would then be incorporated into the permanent regulatory system.

° b. Much unclassified data is disseminated to or accessed by contractors through modems, the electronic interfaces through which the data is transmitted. Uncontrolled use of modems is inherently dangerous from a security standpoint.

25X1 [redacted]

Work is presently being done, principally by OIT and OC, toward creating a Modem Pool which would provide for better security and would permit an audit trail to be created of queries to CIA unclassified systems. Such an audit trail would help us identify attempts at unauthorized access aimed at sensitive but unclassified information.

° c. Other unclassified information is disseminated from CIA on magnetic media, on paper and through oral presentations. Existing discipline, audit and distribution controls should suffice if we apply the above added procedures and enhance awareness.

d. Guidance similar to the above would have to be
25X1 prepared for CIA contractors. [redacted]

2. The approach listed above consists of surveying the data bases, enhancing awareness of the problem and making modest procedural changes to existing or planned mechanisms. This should not prove costly if phased in slowly, appears to have security benefit and is likely to satisfy the basic requirements of NTISSP #2. The group believes that other approaches, such as applying physical and technical security measures, would not be cost effective when measured against the sensitivity of the information to be protected. The key is identifying and removing the sensitive information so that
25X1 costly systems controls are not necessary. [redacted]

3. Addressees are requested to review the above and comment as desired with a view toward using the substance of paragraphs 1 and 2 as a report to the DDA. It is requested
25X1 that you respond by 7 January 1987. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 !OS/EO/PPS/[redacted] (23 Dec. 86)!

!Distribution:!
25X1 ! Orig -[redacted] - OIT/Mgt. Div.!
! 1 - OS/Registry!
! 1 - PPS Chrono!
25X1 ! 1 -[redacted] - OC/ESG/CSS!
! 1 -[redacted] IRMD/OIS!
! 1 -[redacted] ISSD/OS!